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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for illicit networks
10 results foundAuthor: Dietz, Rebekah K. Title: Illicit Networks: Targeting the Nexus Between Terrorists, Proliferators, and Narcotraffickers Summary: Globalization and the liberal international marketplace have provided fertile ground for the rise of transnational and non-state actors. Unfortunately, while states and businesses have profited from the increased fluidity of borders and the rise of global commerce, so have the criminal organizations that threaten national and international security. These illicit networks are stateless; they conduct their business in failed or failing states, under the guise of legitimate commerce, and without regard to sovereign borders or even human life. They are the main facilitators of proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics around the world—undeterred and, perhaps, undeterrable. This thesis offers a comparative analysis of three main types of illicit networks: terrorist, proliferation and narcotics networks. Using Jemaah Islamiyah, the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, and the Medellín drug ‘cartel’ as case studies, it examines their typologies, motivations, structures, characteristics, and sources and patterns of funding. It examines if and how illicit networks overlap, with special attention to intra-network (e.g., terrorist networks with other terrorist networks) and inter-network (e.g., terrorist networks with narcotics networks) overlap. It then explores how this information can inform U.S. counter-network activity. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 135p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 19, 2012 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536899 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536899 Shelf Number: 126752 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug TraffickingIllicit NetworksMedellin CartelSocial Network AnalysisTerrorismTerrorist Networks |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Crime after Jihad: armed groups, the state and illicit business in post-conflict Mali Summary: Mali's descent into a war of secession at the start of 2012 was a conflict foretold. Yet what followed proved radically distinct from the country's three previous episodes of insurgency in its vast, impoverished and arid north. Radical Islamists seized control of the main urban centres of northern Mali, displacing the Tuareg rebels with whom they had struck a working relationship. In the capital, Bamako, a military coup led by an unknown and low-ranking army captain overthrew a president who had been in power for a decade. An uneasy stand-off came into being: Mali's debilitated military guarded the frontiers to the south, while Islamist hardliners and criminals meted out their own version of sharia justice across the north. As is well known, the decomposition of Malian state authority was finally halted early in 2013. Faced with an Islamist advance to the south, French military forces embarked on a lightning intervention that scattered the extremists and reasserted control over the north. Since then, the pace of Mali's post-conflict recovery and stabilization has been astonishing: a UN peacekeeping mission and a host of bilateral and EU programmes have been put into place; a new president and a new National Assembly have been elected; peace talks with the more moderate armed groups, though stuttering, are under way. But as the national government and the international community leave behind the heat of the crisis, it is now incumbent on them to understand what caused such a perilous tailspin to start in Mali, so as to prevent it from reoccurring. As in other countries of West Africa and the Sahel, transnational organized crime has played a prominent role in the affairs of Mali over the past two decades, above all in the north. Drug trafficking, including large consignments of high-value cocaine from Latin America, as well as kidnapping rackets led by Islamist terror groups operating freely across the borders of the Sahel, are both widely regarded as playing key roles in fomenting the instability, unrest and violence that climaxed in 2012. However, the depiction of a crime-terror nexus in Mali, whereby criminal profits feed insurgent arms and recruitment, does not do justice to the multi-faceted role played by illicit activity across the country. This paper is an attempt to marshal all the available evidence, along with the insights provided by experts in Mali, so as to understand the relations that were forged prior to 2012 between criminal enterprises, communities, political and social elites, armed groups, the Malian state and neighbouring countries. On the basis of recent developments, the paper seeks to outline the likely adaptations that the main illicit networks will now make, and to draw out some recommendations as to how best to temper the criminality and violence that menace Mali's post-conflict transition. At the heart of this analysis is an account of how Mali was both the victim of the displacement of drug-trafficking routes and armed jihadist activity from other countries, and a deeply complicit partner in profiting from the incoming wave of illicit trade and Islamist terror. Behind this willing complicity lay the particular vulnerabilities of Malian state and society. Government in Bamako, the country's capital, had by 2006 replaced direct authority over the north with sporadic, ham-fisted interference. Chronic competition between the north's many ethnic, caste and clan groups offered numerous possibilities for the political elite in Bamako to find useful allies to do its bidding. However, these social fissures were also fodder for the designs of other, newer parties: nearby states such as Algeria and Libya, criminal organizations seeking to traffic drugs, and radical armed groups. The resulting transactions between supranational forces and local ethnic or tribal factions were to set Mali on the way to the fourth, and arguably the most threatening, insurgency of its post-colonial history. But Mali's war was not merely the product of radicalized and internationalized disaffection in the north. The conflict also threw a harsh light on the degradation of the state itself. A model for democratic virtue in Africa, half of whose budget was financed by foreign donors, Mali re-emerged after its coup as a state that had been afflicted by multiple vices. Illicit practices had become rampant across the public sector, corroding popular faith in politicians; Mali's celebrated elections had in fact received some of the lowest turnouts in the democratic world. Moreover, the day-to-day corruption, patronage and nepotism formed a permissive soil on which an all-powerful presidency could nurture the construction of a shadow state. The greatest drug trafficking scandal of Malian history, the Air Cocaine case of 2009, suggests that official complicity in the criminal business had penetrated the highest echelons of power. Mali has now set the course for a recovery of legitimate and accountable state authority. Its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, has backed a clean sweep of the judicial system and a Truth Commission on violence in the north. Captain Sanogo, the coup leader, is in jail, along with his accomplices. Key Islamist leaders and narco-traffickers have been scattered or neutered, as have the masterminds of the shadow state. From the information available, it would seem that major illicit trafficking across the north has also diminished in scale. However, it is far too soon to proclaim an end to the crisis. Occasional terrorist attacks and ethnic skirmishes remain a constant headache for local people and UN peacekeepers. At the same time, the pre-war illicit networks are never far away: clearing corruption from the public sector is set to be a long and arduous haul, while illicit networks in political life are destined to regroup and reconfigure, as they have in many other criminalized environments, notably in Latin America. Nearby countries such as Niger and Libya have quickly emerged as staging posts in the Saharan and Sahelian criminal economy. As Mali negotiates its post-conflict recovery, the focus must be directed at ways to reduce the systemic threat from criminal business while avoiding the sorts of blind repressive policies that have engineered insurgencies in Afghanistan, or terrible bloodshed in Mexico. This paper outlines a number of approaches that should lie at the heart of such a balanced, conflict-sensitive strategy towards crime. A robust and inclusive political settlement for the north is critical, though for this to work attention must now focus on how decentralized or autonomous regional authorities can be supervised without the risk of meddling from Bamako. Provision of security and security reform must be imbued with realism as to what can be achieved with the institutions available, and should be shaped by an emphasis on intelligence-led policing that seeks to sever the most dangerous criminal linkages to power-brokers. Counter-terrorism must also be wise to the intermediation of criminal figures, and to the armed networks that illicit businessmen have cultivated. And lastly, it remains imperative that renascent Mali attacks the roots of the shadow state, and is backed by an international community willing to abandon its hunger for fixers in the state and short-term solutions. Details: The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, the Clingendael Institute, 2014. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: CRU Report: Accessed October 30, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mali URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Crime%20after%20Jihad.pdf Shelf Number: 137180 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingIllicit NetworksKidnappingOrganized CrimeTerrorismViolence |
Author: Interpol Title: Against Organized Crime: Interpol Trafficking and Counterfeiting Casebook 2014 Summary: INTERPOL has launched a casebook outlining the links between illicit trade, counterfeiting and organized crime. 'Against Organized Crime: INTERPOL Trafficking and Counterfeiting Casebook 2014' is a compilation of cases from law enforcement worldwide involved in the fight against trafficking in illicit goods and counterfeiting. Through these real-life examples divided into chapters, the reference book details the strong connections between illicit trade and other crimes such as counterfeiting and smuggling, fake medicines, arms smuggling, trafficking in human beings and organs, drug trafficking, financial crimes, terrorism, environmental crime and cybercrime. "The criminal networks behind trafficking in illicit goods and counterfeiting are complex and pervasive, reaching far beyond national borders. The INTERPOL Trafficking and Counterfeiting casebook is the first publicly released study to provide comprehensive evidence of the clear connection between illicit trade and other types of organized crime," said INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble. The casebook discusses the organized criminal networks which are often behind illicit trade, using the profits to fund other criminal endeavours. It also highlights the role INTERPOL is playing to assist law enforcement around the globe in combating these crimes through its Trafficking in Illicit Goods and Counterfeiting programme, by coordinating regional operations, bringing police together, organizing capacity building and training sessions, and awareness raising. Details: Lyon, France: Interpol, 2014. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2016 at: http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-057 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-057 Shelf Number: 138918 Keywords: CounterfeitingIllicit GoodsIllicit NetworksIllicit TradeOrganized Crime |
Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Local Democracy Summary: Local democracy encompasses formal and informal sub-national institutions that respond to citizens' needs. At the centre of local democratic practice are open governments, which provide people with space to promote participation, deliberation and a focus on public interests. However, local state fragility undermines democracy. Organized crime increasingly exploits such weaknesses in order to protect its illicit businesses, as political corruption is an ideal avenue preferred by organized criminal groups. This report examines the interlinkages between organized crime networks and political actors at the local level. It also analyses policy responses (particularly decentralization policies) that haveintentionally or unintentionally- enabled or prevented organized crime engagement in political corruption at the local level. Case studies from Afghanistan, Colombia and Niger illustrate how illicit networks relate to local levels of government and decentralization processes. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2016 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/protecting-politics-deterring-the-influence-of-organized-crime-on-local-democracy-pdf.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/protecting-politics-deterring-the-influence-of-organized-crime-on-local-democracy-pdf.pdf Shelf Number: 140460 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug CartelsIllicit networksOrganized CrimePoliticians |
Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Public Service Delivery Summary: Public service delivery is one of the main tasks citizens expect from their governments. Democracy is a political system that should improve service delivery as it offers the building blocks for equitable resource distribution and sustainable development. Indeed, in the frameworks of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the democratic principles of transparency and accountability play a key role in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. However, in many contexts, public service delivery is fraught with corrupt practices, leading to less accountable and less effective public services that are not adequately reaching those they are intended to serve. Particularly in fragile and conflict affected states, corrupt practices can sometimes be linked to organized crime. These illicit groups and networks increasingly form parallel structures that compete with the state to provide services, either in open conflict with the state, or sometimes working with the explicit or tacit agreement of the authorities. In other cases, however, organized crime does not become a service provider but instead hinders the state's provision of services by leeching off state resources through corruption in public contracts. In all of these cases, organized crime perpetuates poverty and inequality, while threatening economic growth and, by extension, democracy itself. Furthermore, organized crime challenges the state's legitimacy by profiling itself as a viable provider of services to the population, while the state's capacity to provide services is undermined. Citizens are consequently left with hollow democratic state institutions that are not capable of delivering better lives for them. Growing discontent with politics, as reflected in a number of public perceptions surveys and massive protests around the world, are important wake-up calls to implement serious strategies to prevent and mitigate political corruption linked to organized crime. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI) are therefore committed to supporting countries around the world in addressing the threat that organized crime poses to their democracies. Understanding how organized crime challenges the state's legitimacy as public service provider is therefore one important contribution to these efforts. That is why, in 2011, International IDEA launched the Protecting Politics project, conducting research and providing policy support to tackle the nexus between organized crime and political actors. Most importantly, in 2015 International IDEA joined forces with GI to explore the linkages between organized crime and public service delivery. This report summarizes these findings, drawing on case studies from Afghanistan, Colombia and Somalia to analyse in detail how organized crime has become a viable service provider in some localities in these countries, and how it has captured legitimacy from the state in the process. This report complements three other papers that examine how organized crime affects political parties, elections and local democracy, respectively. Together, these four reports provide a unique and detailed overview of democratic systems' capacity to deal with complex security threats such as organized crime. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/protecting-politics-organized-crime-public-service-delivery/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageID=80689 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/protecting-politics-organized-crime-public-service-delivery/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageID=80689 Shelf Number: 140461 Keywords: Criminal Networks Drug CartelsIllicit networks Organized Crime Politicians |
Author: Briscoe, Ivan Title: Illicit Networks and Politics in Latin America Summary: Organized criminal networks are global phenomena that distort local and global economic markets, bring violence and blur the role of the state in providing basic services, all in the interest of increasing their wealth. The main weapon used by such networks is corruption - of politicians and of many of the state apparatuses in the countries in which they operate. This undermines the basic principles of democracy and puts the state at the mercy of illicit economic interests. This is a global challenge. Latin America has particularly suffered from these issues for a number of reasons. The strong presence of illicit networks dedicated to illegal mining, the trafficking of exotic species, arms trafficking and, in particular, the production and sale of illegal drugs such as cocaine has created a massive inflow of illicit money. Together with the high cost of political activity in the region and difficulties in controlling political contributions, this has allowed organized crime to penetrate the political landscape. However, efforts made in different Latin American countries to confront these networks have seen significant achievements. There is a wealth of positive and negative experience on how these problems can be confronted that will be useful for countries in the same region and on other continents. This book focuses on experiences in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru. The authors draw on research that illustrates how relationships are forged between criminals and politicians. They identify numerous mechanisms for tackling these relations, and discuss both the achievements and the challenges concerning their practical application. Details: The Hague: Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), 2014. 305p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics-in-latin-america/en.cfm Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics-in-latin-america/en.cfm Shelf Number: 140463 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug TraffickingIllegal MiningIllicit NetworksMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePolitical CorruptionWildlife Trafficking |
Author: Villaveces-Izquierdo, Santiago Title: Illicit Networks and Politics in the Baltic States Summary: One of the biggest threats to democracy today is infiltration of political processes by transnational organized crime. It undermines constitutional frameworks and the rule of law, it violates the integrity of the electoral process, and it corrupts political parties and the very principle of democratic representation. This study explores how the Baltic States are affected by illicit interests. It looks into how illicit networks and political actors forge relations in this region, from illicit financing of political campaigns, to intimidation of voters, establishment of new political parties, joint economic enterprises and money laundering operations. The authors identify policy responses to this phenomenon, highlighting challenges in implementing them and proposing options on how to strengthen these responses. Details: Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2013. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 28, 2016 at: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics/index.cfm Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.idea.int/publications/illicit-networks-and-politics/index.cfm Shelf Number: 146117 Keywords: Criminal NetworksIllicit NetworksOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Matfess, Hilary, ed. Title: Beyond Convergence: World Without Order Summary: The world order built upon the Peace of Westphalia is faltering. State fragility or failure are endemic, with no fewer than one-third of the states in the United Nations earning a "high warning" -- or worse -- in the Fragile States Index, and an equal number suffering a decline in sustainability over the past decade. State weakness invites a range of illicit actors, including international terrorists, globally networked insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The presence and operations of these entities keep states weak and incapable of effective governance, and limit the possibility of fruitful partnerships with the United States and its allies. Illicit organizations and their networks fuel corruption, eroding state legitimacy among the governed, and sowing doubt that the state is a genuine guardian of the public interest. These networks can penetrate the state, leading to state capture, and even criminal sovereignty. A growing number of weak and corrupt states is creating gaping holes in the global rule-based system of states that we depend on for our security and prosperity. Indeed, the chapters of this book suggest the emergence of a highly adaptive and parasitic alternative ecosystem, based on criminal commerce and extreme violence, with little regard for what we commonly conceive of as the public interest or the public good. The last 10 years have seen unprecedented growth in interactivity between and among a wide range of illicit networks, as well as the emergence of hybrid organizations that use methods characteristic of both terrorist and criminal groups. In a convergence of interests, terrorist organizations collaborate with cartels, and trafficking organizations collude with insurgents. International terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, engage energetically in transnational crime to raise funds for their operations. Prominent criminal organizations like Los Zetas in Mexico and D-Company in Pakistan have adopted the symbolic violence of terrorists—the propaganda of the deed—to secure their “turf.” And networked insurgents, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have adopted the techniques of both crime and terror. An Emerging Criminal Ecosystem The unimpeded trajectory of these trends -- convergence, hybridization, and state capture -- poses substantial risks to the national security interests of the United States, and threatens international security. Illicit networked organizations are challenging the fundamental principles of sovereignty that undergird the international system. Fragile and failing states are both prey to such organizations, which feed on them like parasites, and Petri dishes for them, incapable of supporting effective security partnerships. The Westphalian, rule-based system of sovereign polities itself is at risk of fraying, as fewer and fewer capable states survive to meet these challenges, and populations around the world lose faith in the Westphalian paradigm. The emergence of an alternative ecosystem of crime and violence threatens us all and much of the progress we have seen in recent centuries. This dark underworld weakens national sovereignty and erodes international partnerships. We should not take for granted the long-term durability of the Westphalian system. It was preceded by millennia of much less benign forms of governance, and alternative futures are imaginable. This book describes "convergence" (the interactivity and hybridization of diverse illicit networks), the emergence of new networks and new domains or "battlespaces," and the threat illicit networks pose to national and international security. It examines dystopian visions of a world in which these trajectories go indefinitely unimpeded, and concludes by discussing possible countermeasures to be explored. While some recognize the growing threat to the global system of governance that these new phenomena impose, others are skeptical. According to the conventional wisdom, TCOs and international terrorist organizations are unlikely candidates for partnership. Such analysis suggests that criminals are motivated by the pursuit of wealth in defiance of law, morality, or ideology. They typically prefer to remain undetected, and have little interest in the violence committed by, or risks taken by, international terrorists. Already pursued by law enforcement, criminals are not keen to receive the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency or SEAL Team Six. International terrorists and insurgents, on the other hand, are politically motivated; driven by ideological, religious, or nationalistic motives; and repelled by the vulgar materialism and greed of criminals. They have no desire to get on the radar of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or other national or international law enforcement agencies. This logic is understandable, and may have prevailed in previous times, but the evidence of extensive interconnectivity -- if not explicit partnership -- between TCOs, international terrorists, and globally networked insurgents is compelling. Recent research undertaken by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point reveals that, "criminals and terrorists are largely subsumed (98 percent) in a single network as opposed to operating in numerous smaller networks."4 In its Performance Budget Congressional Submission for FY 2014, the DEA stated that by "the end of the first quarter of FY 2013, 25 of the 67 organizations on the Attorney Generals Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) List are associated with terrorist organizations." According to a more recent DEA statement, roughly half of the Department of State's 59 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations have been linked to the global drug trade. The six degrees of separation that may have once divided people is a relic of the past—today, international terrorists, insurgents, and criminals are merely a click away from each other. It might be argued that terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime have existed since time immemorial, and that their modern iterations represent nothing new. Such an argument naively discounts modern enablers such as information and communication technology, transportation advances, and the unprecedented volumes of money generated in illicit markets. These are game changers. They permit illicit actors to avail themselves of lethal technology, military-grade weaponry, real-time information, and professional services of the highest quality, including legal, accounting, technological, security, and paramilitary services. Cartels and gangs, as well as terrorists and some insurgents, can now out-man, outspend, and outgun the governments of the countries where they reside. They can communicate across the globe in real time, using widely available and inexpensive technology. The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attackers used satellite phones, internet communications, and global positioning systems, under the direction of Pakistan-based handlers to carry out an atrocious binge of murder and terror. The string of ISIL attacks across Europe in 2015 and 2016 further illustrates the global consequences of this technological acceleration. International travel has never been easier or cheaper than it is today, and would-be terrorists, traffickers, launderers, and even assassins can fly nearly undetected from continent to continent, in the sea of traveling humanity. Though it is clear that this connectivity is widespread and threatens global security, the details of the agreements or arrangements between terrorist, insurgent, and transnational criminal organizations remain murky. A partial exception to this is in instances where both organizations wish for new relationships to be known, such as the 1998 merger of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.8 Other relationships, such as between the FARC and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are opaque as neither organization has an interest in revealing the relationship. It is unclear in the majority of cases what kinds of partnerships these are, and we are often unable to discern whether such instances of cooperation are one-time affairs or longer-term arrangements. This lack of information handicaps our response and threatens global security. The purposeful opacity of illicit organizations presents a vexing challenge to mapping and understanding these actors. Operating by intention outside the vision of regulators or researchers, their activities and revenues are hidden. So how do we determine the magnitude of their operations, or the harm they inflict? How do we know the value of their transactions? We extrapolate from extremely inexact evidence, such as seizures, arrests, convictions, and the associated testimony of witnesses, often themselves members of such organizations and motivated to dissemble. Analysts still rely on the nearly 20-year-old "International Monetary Fund (IMF) consensus range," of "$1 to $3 trillion" or "two to five percent" of global product. In 1998, Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, provided that estimate of the amount of money laundered annually across the globe. Given what we know about global trafficking in drugs, persons, weapons, counterfeits, and other contraband it seems unlikely that the value of illicit trade has decreased over the past 20 years. Even at a “mere” two to five percent of global product, Camdessus described the magnitude of the problem as “almost beyond imagination….”9 Less difficult, but still challenging and far more visceral to calculate, is the cost of global terrorism in human lives. At publication, the most recent estimates suggest that 2014 saw an increase of 35 percent in the number of terrorist attacks globally, with total fatalities rising to nearly 33,000 by some counts; 2015 is likely to mark another increase, as ISIL continues its brutal global campaign, and Boko Haram terrorizes the Lake Chad Basin.10 This does not take into account nonfatal injuries, the destruction of families and communities, and the economic costs. These cannot be monetized, but few would deny that the opportunity cost of the "global war on terror" (GWOT) has been huge. A 2008 estimate by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes put the long-term costs of the Iraq War at $3 trillion. The Cost of War Project puts the total economic cost of America's post-9/11 campaigns at $4.4 trillion through FY 2014.12 These two sets of costs -- the global illicit market plus the costs associated with the GWOT -- comprise a staggering portion of global product, and give a plausible indication of the magnitude of the emerging alternative ecosystem. Consider the drag on global productivity and development if so much of human activity is dedicated to transnational crime and terrorism. Adding to this, the cost of networked insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan, suggests that an unconscionable proportion of global resources is being expended by efforts to undermine the well-being of citizens worldwide. Imagine what might be accomplished for all mankind if those resources were available for more constructive investment. Net Systemic Costs Not only do these networks divert economic resources globally, but they also reduce the capacity of states to govern, rendering them incapable of effectively governing their territory or borders, let alone exercising a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or providing other vital public services. The net systemic harm is imposed at four levels: the inability of states to govern their populations and territories, which creates seedbeds for international terrorism, networked insurgency, and transnational crime, causing immense human suffering; the regional spillover effect from state fragility and instability, that sometimes penetrates key U.S. allies and partners; the growing feral regions that serve as launch pads for attacks against U.S. national security interests worldwide, as well as potentially direct attacks on the homeland, as occurred on September 11, 2001; and the cost associated with the decline of the global, rule-based system and the shrinking Westphalian domain. A cursory examination of a few key states shows the toll illicit networks take on our national security interests. Though Mexico's death rate has subsided somewhat over the past two years, the wars between the narcotics cartels and state authorities, and between the cartels themselves, are thought to have caused as many as 130,000 deaths between 2007 and 2013, or over 20,000 per year. Mexican cartels today work hand-in-hand with the criminal gangs of Central America's Northern Triangle -- comprised of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala -- resulting in some of the highest homicide rates in the world. El Salvador's official forensic unit estimated the homicide rate in 2014 at nearly 70 per 100,000. Despite their collaborative intentions, these countries are under such duress that their security partnership contributions cannot yet inspire confidence. Indeed, in 2014, nearly 70,000 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico made their way through Mexico to the United States to escape the tormented lands of their births. Another key security partner, Nigeria is the most populous African state with the largest economy, and a major oil producer. Nigeria could and should play a stabilizing role throughout the continent. In fact, Nigerian forces were critical in staunching the civil wars that hemorrhaged West Africa in the 1990s through the 2000s. Yet today, Nigeria is hobbled by the burgeoning Boko Haram insurgency in the north, and resurgent gang insurgency in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the Boko Haram scourge has bled into the neighboring countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The once-hopeful suppositions that Iraq and Afghanistan could act as U.S. security partners now seem to be wishful thinking. Despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars to bolster the capacity of these two potential partners, effective collaboration seems extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan today struggles to survive the attacks of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Haqqani networks, and more recently ISIL. Though the Government of Afghanistan welcomes U.S. engagement, its effectiveness as a security partner remains questionable. Similarly, Iraq struggles to survive as an autonomous state, depending on Kurdish and Shia nonstate militias in its fight with ISIL. Afghanistan and Iraq may continue to act as incubators for terrorist groups planning attacks against the United States well into the future. Though the nature or extent of the connections between these terrorist and criminal organizations is not transparent, what is clear is that when they desire to interact, they are able to do so. Joint training, learning, and sharing of experience are certainly likely, if not yet joint operations. While states unwillingly and unwittingly act as safe havens for destabilizing global actors, even more troubling are instances in which there is clear collusion between such groups and elements of sovereign states. For example, Iran's Quds Force, a special forces unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has been both directly engaged in terrorist acts around the world, and is supportive of other terrorist organizations. Ominously, in 2011, an attempt by the Quds Force to collaborate with the Los Zetas cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States was intercepted. That this effort was interdicted by the vigilant DEA is extremely fortunate -- at that particular moment in time, with the combustible tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Sunni and Shia throughout the Islamic world, the consequences of the intended assassination are difficult to imagine. One need only consider the consequences of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo just a century ago to put this into perspective. This effort by the Quds Force to conspire with Los Zetas, now fully documented in U.S. case law, demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the potential collusion of sovereign states and terrorist organizations with criminal organizations. This type of collusion is not limited to the Middle East. As Douglas Farah has written, Venezuela has utilized the state's diplomatic tools to support criminal and terrorist activity. North Korea has long been known as a hub of illicit activity, allegedly including smuggling, counterfeit trade, production of controlled substances, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering. Pyongyang's infamous Bureau 39 is thought to generate between $500 million and $1 billion per year from such illicit activities. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2016. 402p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Shelf Number: 144992 Keywords: Counterfeit TradeIllicit NetworksISISNational SecurityOrganized CrimeSmugglingTerrorismTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: International Crisis Group Title: The Central African Crisis: From Predation to Stabilisation Summary: he crisis that has plagued the Central African Republic (CAR) since December 2012, particularly predation by both authorities and armed groups, has led to the collapse of the state. Under the Seleka, bad governance inherited from former regimes worsened. Its leaders looted state resources and controlled the countrys illicit economic networks. Ending this cycle of predatory rule and moving peacefully to a state that functions and can protect its citizens requires CAR’s international partners to prioritise, alongside security, economic revival and the fight against corruption and illegal trafficking. Only a close partnership between the government, UN and other international actors, with foreign advisers working alongside civil servants in key ministries, can address these challenges. Governance under the short Seleka rule (March-December 2013) was deceptive: the regime proclaimed its positive intentions while, like its predecessors, plundering public funds and abusing power for self-enrichment. Though Seleka fighters were involved in illicit activities even before, once in power the movement asserted control of lucrative trafficking networks (gold, diamond and ivory). Their systematic looting destroyed what was already a phantom state. Retaliation by anti-balaka fighters against Muslims – the majority of traders are Muslim – aggravated the economic collapse. The economy fell apart even before the state; yet the current international intervention spearheaded by the G5 (African Union, UN, European Union, the U.S. and France) focuses for the most part on security. Troops are being mobilised, but if a principal cause of the conflict – entrenched predation – is left unaddressed, the international community will repeat the failures of its past interventions. Protecting citizens is important; but so too is rekindling economic activity and improving financial public management to help build an effective public governance system delivering services for all CAR citizens, both Muslim and Christian. A new UN mission (MINUSCA) will be deployed in September 2014. In addition to its current mandate – protecting civilians, assisting a political transition, supporting humanitarian work and monitoring human rights – it must change the incentive structure for better governance. It should prioritise rebuilding the economy and public institutions and fighting trafficking. The region and relevant multilateral organisations should be involved too. Targeted sanctions against spoilers in and outside CAR should be embedded in a more comprehensive strategy to revive the economy. Some politicians with ties to armed groups or who are eyeing what are for the moment hypothetical presidential elections could resist a tight partnership between the state and international community. But the transitional government's demand for strong international support offers an opportunity to forge such a partnership and adopt the policies essential to both stabilise the country and promote a change of governance. Details: Brussels: International crisis Group, 2014. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 219: Accessed March 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-central-african-crisis-from-predation-to-stabilisation.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/the-central-african-crisis-from-predation-to-stabilisation.pdf Shelf Number: 141376 Keywords: Illegal TradeIllegal TraffickingIllicit NetworksNatural ResourcesPolitical Corruption |
Author: C4ADS Title: Sandcastles: Tracing Sanctions Evasion Through Dubai's Luxury Real Estate Market Summary: Executive Summary Illicit actors, whether narcotics traffickers, nuclear proliferators, conflict financiers, kleptocrats, large-scale money launderers, or terrorists, all share a common need: they must move the proceeds of their criminal endeavors from the illicit marketplace into the licit financial system in order to use them effectively. Luxury real estate has become a significant pathway for this conversion, facilitated by imperfect information regarding ownership and the details behind these substantial financial transactions. This vulnerability affects major real estate markets around the world, including, but not limited to, London, Toronto, Hong Kong, New York, Singapore, Doha, Sydney, and Paris. Dubai, the largest city in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has become a favorable destination for these funds due in part to its high-end luxury real estate market and lax regulatory environment prizing secrecy and anonymity. While the UAE has taken steps to address this issue, its response thus far has failed to fully confront the underlying drivers enabling the manipulation of its real estate market. The permissive nature of this environment has global security implications far beyond the UAE. In an interconnected global economy with low barriers impeding the movement of funds, a single point of weakness in the regulatory system can empower a range of illicit actors. Our research shows that lax regulatory and enforcement environments in Dubai, but also in other financial centers have attracted criminal capital from around the world and offered a pathway into the international financial system for illicit actors and funds. In this report, we examine seven individuals and organizations, their associated corporate networks, and their real estate holdings. We identify 44 properties worth approximately $28.2 million directly associated with sanctioned individuals, as well as 37 properties worth approximately $78.8 million within their expanded networks. Each of these people has been sanctioned by the United States (US), and many have also been designated by the European Union (EU) and EU member states. These networks are, therefore, deserving of particularly intense regulatory scrutiny. However, our research reveals that they have invested millions of dollars in luxury UAE real estate while continuing to engage in illicit activity within the last few years. Details: Washington, DC: 2018. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 18, 2019 at: https://www.c4reports.org/sandcastles/ Year: 2018 Country: United Arab Emirates URL: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58831f2459cc684854aa3718/t/5b1fd4bf575d1ff600587770/1528812745821/Sandcastles.pdf Shelf Number: 154241 Keywords: Conflict FinanciersDubaiFinancial CrimeIllicit ActorsIllicit NetworksLuxury Real EstateMoney LaunderingReal EstateTerroristsUAE |